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In 1995, for the first time since the 1930s, the United States failed to pass new farm program legisla-
tion. The inability to pass farm legislation occurred despite bipartisan agreement that farm programs
should continue the trend over the past decade of less government intervention. This paper discusses
the sequence of events, the role of agricultural economists, the major issues, and the lessons learned
from the 1995 Farru Bill debate. The trend toward declining government intervention in agriculture
will require that the profession look increasingly to the private sector for solutions to the problems
facing agriculture in the twenty-first century.
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The title of this invited papers session is: “Did the
1995 Farm Bill Address the Critical Issues?’ The
simple and obvious answer is no. Since 1995 is now
behind us, we can definitely bury the idea of a 1995
Farm Bill. Maybe there will be a 1996 Farm Bill,
but that, too, is uncertain. Not since the 1930s has
the United States been so deadlocked on farm pro-
grams. Farmers are just a month or two away from
planting and they still don’t know what the 1996
farm programs will be.
It is ironic that during debate on the Uruguay
Round agreement, some members of Congress
moved to abolish permanent farm program statutes
and extend current program authorities indefi-
nitely—since permanent authorities failed to meet
U.S. obligations under the agreement. The Secre-
tary at that time, Mr. Espy, said no because he
wanted to ensure there would be an open debate on
farm policy. As pointed out by each of the previous
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three authors (O’Brien, Dicks, and Conley), that
never happened in 1995.
Before addressing the several issues presented
in the previous papers, I would like to first examine
what the 1996 farm programs might look like, re-
flect on Congress’ inability to pass new farm legis-
lation in 1995, examine the unique characteristics
of the 1990 Farm Bill, and take a look at the types
of information that were provided to policymakers
in 1995. The remainder of my remarks will address
whether the analysis provided to policymakers ad-
dressed the issues, the role of equity in the farm bill
debate, and issues for future farm bills.
What Will the 1996 Farm Programs
Look Like?
Several possibilities remain for the 1996 farm com-
modity programs—a one-year or possibly a two-
year extension of current law, some version of Free-
dom to Farm (also known as the Agricultural
Market Transition Act, or AMTA), extension of cur-
rent law with greater planting flexibility and an in-
crease in nonpayment acres, or higher price support46 Journal ofAgricultural and Applied Economics, July 1996
loan rates combined with marketing loans. If new
farm program legislation is not enacted by mid-
1996, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)
would continue to support the prices and incomes
of farmers by reverting to permanent statutes pro-
vided under the Commodity Credit Corporation
(CCC) Charter Act, the Agricultural Adjustment
Act of 1938, and the Agricultural Act of 1949.
If Congress fails to pass new farm program leg-
islation in 1996, some 1996 programs will be es-
sentially unchanged from 1995, while others would
revert back to programs that were last instituted
more than 30 years ago. For example, program au-
thorities that existed in 1995 for dairy, peanuts, to-
bacco, sugar, oilseeds, and upland cotton continue
through 1996. Furthermore, permanent authorities
under the CCC Charter Act could be used to estab-
lish a rice marketing loan program providing about
the same level of producer support as the 1995 pro-
gram. In contrast, the wheat and feed grain pro-
grams would revert to parity-based price support
loan rates, with support for wheat ranging from 75
to 90~0 of parity ($6,52 to $7.82 per bushel) and
support for corn ranging from 50 to 90% of parity
($2,95 to $5.30 per bushel). For wheat, only pro-
ducers who harvest within their allotment would
be eligible to place grain under loan. Acreage al-
lotments were last announced in 1977, and since
then, most, if not all, allotment records have been
either destroyed, lost, or are incompatible with the
USDA’s existing farm records system.
Over the next few months, Congress will try
again to pass new farm legislation and avoid the
disruption of reverting to permanent legislation, but
the ultimate outcome remains uncertain. The House
Agriculture Committee has passed the AMTA and
sent it to the House floor (H.R. 2854). A similar
version of the bill has been passed by the Senate (S.
1541). But, even if a version of the AMTA eventu-
ally passes Congress, some anticipate a presidential
veto. If that occurs, Congress would likely have
to start over, since it is doubtful there would be
enough votes to override a presidential veto.
How Did the Stalemate Occur?
An important question to consider is how the legis-
lative impasse on farm programs could have been
avoided—because surely we don’t want to repeat it
in the future. Looking back over the past decade,
agricultural policy basically has followed a Repub-
lican philosophy of less government intervention.
Less government intervention came in the form of
lower target prices and loan rates, nonpayment
acres, and planting flexibility. These policy changes
were reinforced by the need to reduce federal
spending and correspond with the concerns of
economists regarding the distortions caused by
farm programs. What is most noteworthy is that this
policy trend toward less government intervention
occurred when one or both houses of Congress
were controlled by the Democratic party and the
presidency was Republican.
The political party makeup was just the oppo-
site in 1995—a Republican-controlled Congress
and a Democratic President. Republican congres-
sional members began 1995 by developing a seven-
year balanced budget package, which called for re-
ducing farm program spending by about $13 billion
over seven years. Democrats had essentially no in-
put into the Republican balanced budget package.
As a result, voting of the entire package was along
party lines and vetoed by the President.
In contrast to previous farm bill years, the
House and Senate Agriculture Committees and
Congress did not pass stand-alone farm legislation
in 1995, The Republican leadership argued that
once a package to balance the budget was passed,
additional agricultural legislation would follow,
thereby forming a comprehensive farm bill. In fact,
the agriculture committees marked up conserva-
tion, export, research, and rural development titles
to be included in a comprehensive farm bill in
1995.
Congressional Republicans did not move until
mid-January of this year to separate out farm pro-
grams from legislation to balance the budget, But
the need to pass a farm bill quickly left many Dem-
ocrats feeling they were not included in the farm
policy debate. Thus, philosophical differences be-
tween Republicans and Democrats were only partly
to blame for the inability to pass new farm legisla-
tion in 1995, In fact, many Democrats and Republi-
cans agree that farm programs should continue the
trend of less government intervention.
What’s in a Farm Bill?
The previous presenters leave the impression that
many broad issues were not addressed in the 1995Salathe: The 1995 Farm Bill: Discussion 47
Farm Bill debate. I agree with that conclusion, but
we should keep in mind that a farm bill is not all
encompassing—no farm bill is going to address all
of the “critical” issues facing agriculture.
The 1990 Farm Bill may have created an unreal-
istic expectation for subsequent farm bills. The
1990 Farm Bill contained 25 separate titles and
1,237 pages, of which 478 were devoted to explana-
tory notes. Thirteen titles of the 1995 Farm Bill
addressed topics other than price and income sup-
port programs. Those titles included: forestry, fruit
and vegetable marketing, conservation, agricultural
trade, research, food programs, credit, promotion
programs, grain quality, crop insurance and disas-
ter assistance, rural development, global climate
change, and miscellaneous provisions. In compari-
son, the 1981 and 1985 Farm Bills contained 17
titles, seven of which addressed topics other than
price and income support programs. Thus, the 1990
Farm Bill covered more issues than past farm bills
and may prove to be the biggest and most compre-
hensive farm bill in this nation’s history.
The three previous farm bills all contained
trade, credit, conservation, research, and food pro-
gram titles. However, the House’s AMTA does not
contain credit, research, and food program titles;
further, both the trade and conservation titles are
more limited in scope than in past farm bills. Wel-
fare reform explains why the AMTA does not con-
tain a food program title, and a trade title with more
limited scope is explained by the implementation
of the North American Free Trade Agreement and
the Uruguay Round trade agreement. Furthermore,
it is not surprising that the Republican-controlled
Congress moved toward a more narrowly focused
farm bill in 1995, since one of the primary objec-
tives of Republicans was to reduce the size and
scope of the federal government.
The previous presenters expressed concerns
that Congress did not address a broader spectrum
of issues in the 1995 Farm Bill debate, Unlike the
commodity programs, program authorities do not
expire or revert back to antiquated provisions for
research, credit, conservation, rural development,
and trade programs. These programs continue, and
program redirection can occur through the annual
budget appropriations process. Thus, no emergency
is created if credit, conservation, rural develop-
ment, research, and trade programs are not ad-
dressed in the farm bill.
Looking ahead, I expect future farm bills to be
much less comprehensive than the 1990 Farm Bill.
The gradual decline in support for agriculture and
reduced rural and farm representation in Congress
will mean less interest in agricultural issues and
less willingness to spend the time and effort to
hammer out farm bills as comprehensive as that in
1990.
The Profession’s Response to the
1995 Farm Bill
The inability of Congress to pass a farm bill is cer-
tainly very disappointing to those of us who have
now worked more than two years on the “1995”
Farm Bill, But, we should not let this disappoint-
ment overshadow the efforts made by agricultural
economists to provide policymakers with the infor-
mation and analysis for making sound policy deci-
sions.
Early in 1994, the USDA began preparing for
the 1995 Farm Bill debate. Preparation began with
a Secretarial retreat. One of the main subject areas
of the retreat was the 1995 Farm Bill, The USDA’s
Office of the Chief Economist and the Economic
Research Service (ERS) jointly prepared a paper on
the 1995 Farm Bill for that retreat which covered
the history and the effects of farm programs and
options for the 1995 Farm Bill (USDA/ERS 1994b),
Following the retreat, the Secretary established
several task forces to further develop background
papers and options for the 1995 Farm Bill.
In the fall of 1994, the White House felt that
other agencies should also be involved in devel-
oping the administration’s farm bill proposal and es-
tablished several interagency task forces for the
purpose of reaching a consensus on the final pro-
posal. Ailer several months of intense negotiations,
the administration released its 1995 Farm Bill pro-
posal, or “Blue Book.” The “Blue Book” covered
all the program areas of the USDA—commodity
and marketing; rural development; conservation
and environment; trade; food and nutrition; re-
search, education, and economics; and food safety.
With respect to commodity and conservation
programs, the administration’s farm bill proposal
called for increased planting flexibility, less reii-
ance on acreage reduction programs, a limited in-
crease in nonpayment acres as the contribution to
deficit reduction, elimination of payments to farm-48 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, July 1996
ers earning more than $100,000 off-farm, extension
of authority to enroll new acreage in the Conserva-
tion Reserve Program (CRP), and more involve-
ment at the local level in conservation programs.
Following the release of the administration’s
farm bill proposal, the Secretary testified before the
House and Senate Agriculture Committees on the
proposal and options for reducing the cost of farm
programs by $13 billion over seven years (Glick-
man). Inaddition todiscussing theadministration’s
proposal, the Secretary presented three options for
reaching the $13 billion in proposed cuts. Those
options included the administration’s proposal with
an increase in nonpayment acres, a targeting pro-
posal along with an increase in nonpayment acres,
and a marketing loan proposal.
During 1995, the USDA, at the request of Ag-
riculture Committee staff, conducted numerous
briefings on the operation and the effects of current
farm programs and the administration’s proposal. At
the request of the House and Senate Agriculture
Committee staffs, the USDA provided data on
program variables, such as acreage idled, loan
rates, flex acreage, deficiency payment rates, target
prices, and program participation rates, and on the
supply, use, stocks, and prices of program commod-
ities. The ERS briefed staff members on rural eco-
nomic conditions, the financial characteristics of
payment recipients, and proposals to target farm
program payments. The ERS also published a se-
ries of background and issues papers on the 1995
Farm Bill (USDA/ERS 1994a, 1995a, b).
The USDA responded to numerous requests
from congressional members and staff for analysis
in 1995. Policy options analyzed included various
marketing loan and acreage flexibility proposals
and an accelerated phase-out of farm programs. At
the request of Senator Dole, the USDA conducted
an analysis of the equity by commodity of farm pol-
icy changes beginning with the 1985 Farm Bill
(USDA/Office of the Chief Economist). In addi-
tion, commodity and policy specialists within the
USDA communicated informally with congres-
sional staff and members on the possible effects of
proposed policy options.
The academic community, commodity, conser-
vation and farm groups, agribusiness organizations,
and private consultants also provided a steady flow
of information to congressional members and staff
during the 1995 Farm Bill debate. The Food and
Agricultural Policy Research Institute (FAPRI), for
example, briefed the House and Senate Agriculture
Committees on the effects of several farm bill pro-
posals, including the AMTA (FAPRI 1995a, b, c).
Another source of information is the immense base
of literature that has accumulated over the years on
agricultural policy—journal articles, books, popu-
lar articles in newspapers and magazines, govern-
ment reports, etc. As an example, the General Ac-
counting Office (GAO) in the past two years has
published reports on the cotton and rice programs,
including estimates of societal costs (GAO 1994,
1995).
Did the Profession Address the Issues?
The papers of both Dr. Conley and Dr. Dicks sup-
port the conclusion that the agricultural economics
profession failed to provide the information poli-
cymakers needed in the 1995 Farm Bill debate. For
example, in his paper Dr. Conley states, “Econo-
mists seemed limited in their contributions to the
specific policy decisions” that were taken. He also
observes:
Broad policy issues were raised early in the pro-
cess by economists such as Gardner and Ttveeten,
questioning the justifications for existing farm
policy. . . . Yet, on the specific issues which Con-
gress considered, . . . economists were noticeably
small in number in providing analysis that would
encourage examination of the tradeoffs implicit
in the policy alternatives.
Senator Lugar, early in the debate, questioned
the need for commodity programs. At least two
comprehensive studies were provided to Congress
on the effects of phasing out farm commodity pro-
grams—one by the USDA (USDA/ERS 1995b)
and another by FAPRI in conjunction with the Ag-
ricultural and Food Policy Center (AFPC). Each of
these studies provided estimates of the effects of a
phase-out on commodity prices, supply and use,
and farm income, along with other indicators of the
financial well-being of the sector as a whole and
specific farming operations. In addition, the Coali-
tion for a Competitive Food and Agricultural Sys-
tem (Miller), the Progressive Foundation (Runge,
Schnittker, and Penny), and the Heritage Founda-
tion (Frydenlund) published reports or made state-
ments regarding the effects of eliminating farmSalathe: The 1995 Farm Bill: Discussion 49
programs, but these reports were not as comprehen-
sive and generally examined the effects of a phase-
out on only a few indicators.
The Heritage Foundation study suggested that
farm income would be much higher without farm
programs. The foundation argued that without farm
programs, farmers would plant more acreage and
that the increased production could be sold abroad
without depressing market prices. In contrast, the
USDAIERS and AFPC/FAPRI studies showed a
decrease in acreage and exports under a phase-out.
These two studies also indicated that farm income
would fall under a phase-out, but the drop in in-
come would be less than the drop in program pay-
ments.
Dr. Conley suggests that the differences in
supply response between the various program elim-
ination and program phase-out studies reduced the
value of economic analyses in the policy process.
Dr. Dicks makes an even stronger statement in his
paper. In his concluding statement, he asserts,
“Many of the statements made by agricultural econ-
omists during the 1995 farm debate had little sup-
port in the agricultural economics literature.”
Let’s consider the congressional staffer who re-
ceives two different studies that report conflicting
results. The staffer can throw up his or her hands
and say the economists don’t know. Alternatively,
that individual could carefully study the two re-
ports, closely scrutinize the analysis and assump-
tions and, perhaps, review the literature. The staffer
might also inquire into the credentials of the re-
port’s author. A thorough review along these lines
could possibly lead the staffer to place more con fi-
dence in one study over another, forming the basis
upon which the staffer reaches a conclusion as to
&e effects of a particular policy.
Both increased planting flexibility and elimina-
tion of ARPs had bipartisan support in 1995. Econ-
omists are in agreement that increased planting
flexibility and the elimination of acreage-idling
programs would reduce the distortions caused by
farm programs. As Dr. Conley points out, analysts
disagree over the effects that increased planting
flexibility and the elimination of acreage-idling
programs would have on planted acreage. Never-
theless, increased planting flexibility and the elimi-
nation of ARPs reduce the distortion caused by
farm programs and should be implemented for that
reason alone.
Another issue voiced by Senator Lugar was fis-
cal accountability. He argued that attempts to re-
duce farm program spending failed because actual
spending on farm programs exceeded projections.
That concern supported either fixing the amount or
capping the level of payments. The idea of fixed
payments is not new. In 1985, Senators Boschwitz
and Boren introduced the Family Farm Protection
Act, which provided fixed and declining payments
to producers of wheat, feed grains, rice, cotton,
and oilseeds.
All of the preceding authors conclude that
the policy-making process followed by the
Republican-controlled Congress in 1995 greatly re-
duced the opportunities for debate and analysis of
specific issues. However, the public has had the op-
portunity to debate the administration’s proposal
with payments inversely related to market prices
and AMTA’s fixed payments for months now. Con-
gress has also had time to review a FAPRI study
that compared the two policy options (FAPRI
1995b) and another study that provided long-term
projections assuming fixed payments (FAPRI
1995C).
In recent months, the AMTA has drawn strong
support from several agricultural economists. Fif-
teen agricultural economists, including Dale Ha-
thaway Willard C!ochrane, D. Gale Johnson, Bruce
Gardner, Don Paarlburg, Luther lbeeten, and
several others, wrote a letter to the President of
the United States indicating their support for the
AMTA. Here is an excerpt from that letter, dated
December 13, 1995:
It is right, after 60 years, to end government-
imposed acreage controls, to provide farmers the
flexibility to make their own planting decisions,
to keep price supports at competitive levels, and
to limit spending on deficiency payments.
I do not believe these economists reached this con-
clusion hastily and before they carefully explored
other program alternatives.
Equity and the 1995 Farm Bill
The level and distribution of program payments,
one measure of equity, continues to be a concern.
Initially, the administration argued that the level of
payments provided under the AMTA were too low,50 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, July 1996
because the bill cut more from farm programs than
the administration proposed. That argument proved
to be invalid. Compared with the Congressional
Budget Office’s (CBO’S) February 1995 baseline,
the AMTA reduced payments to farmers by $8.6
billion during fiscal years 1996–2002. Compared
with the USDA’s Februa~ 1995 baseline, which
projected higher prices and lower outlays than the
CBO’S baseline, the AMTA increased payments by
$4.6 billion over seven years. As these baselines
were revised during 1995 to reflect more up-to-date
market conditions, the CBO’S projections of sav-
ings declined and the USDA’s projections of in-
creased cost grew. The CBO projected in December
that payments to farmers would be reduced by just
$1 billion under the AMTA over the next seven
years, compared with continuation of current pro-
grams. In December, the USDA projected the bill
would provide a staggering $20 billion more in pay-
ments over seven years.
One possible measure of equity is to compare
payments under the AMTA to historical payments.
Over the past seven crop years, total program pay-
ments to producers of program crops amounted to
$37 billion. Over the next seven crop years, pay-
ments under the AMTA would total $36.3 billion.
Furthermore, the distribution of payments across
commodities under the AMTA is close to the histor-
ical allocation. Feed grains accounted for 539Z0,
wheat 26.3?Z0,rice 9.99Z0,and upland cotton 10.79ZO
of the payments over the previous seven years. Un-
der the AMTA, feed grains would account for
53.2%, wheat 27.3Y0, rice 7.8Y0, and upland cotton
11.7% of total payments. Thus, only the share to
rice producers seems low compared with history.
Dr. Dicks argues that economists should spend
more time measuring equity, but he also states that
“the economist is best trained to determine effi-
ciency.” Economists can and do provide measures
of equity all the time. Equity measures are typically
derived by manipulating the output of economic
analysis and by examining the effects of programs
at the micro level. I do not believe that agricultural
economists should try to develop more elaborate
models for the specific purpose of measuring eq-
uity—because I don’t believe economists can deter-
mine with any degree of accuracy what is or is not
equitable, and there is no single measure of equity.
Agricultural economists can best provide informa-
tion on the economic effects of policy options. De-
ciding what is or is not equitable is best left to the
political process.
Issues for Future Farm Bills
Dr. Dicks states that several critical issues need to
be analyzed in as complete a modeling framework
as is possible. He mentions regional concerns, ex-
cess capacity, environmental and food safety, land
use, income, and rural economies. Dr. O’Brien also
mentions a somewhat similar list of issues in his
paper. These are all interesting research topics, and
research on these subjects should continue, But
looking back on 1995, I doubt whether addressing
these issues in a comprehensive modeling frame-
work would have contributed much to the debate.
Could it be that policymakers didn’t consider
these issues to be of primary importance, or to be
the ones that needed to be addressed in the 1995
Farm Bill? This doesn’t necessarily mean that we
as a profession should ignore these issues, because
some day in the future they may emerge as the con-
cerns of highest priority to policymakers. For ex-
ample, is the move to a more market-oriented agri-
culture over the past decade a direct result of the
vast body of knowledge that has accumulated in the
agricultural economics literature over the past 20 or
so years? Paraphrasing Dr. Conley, “An economist’s
solution was reached even though economists were
noticeably absent.” Can this be explained by the no-
tion that policymakers had been influenced by the
thoughts and writings of economists over the years?
Fhal Observations
In the future, the move toward less government in-
tervention will require that agricultural economists
look first to the private sector for solutions rather
than to the federal government. We’ll not only have
to ‘identify the issues and conduct analysis, but
we’ 11also have to explore a wider range of options
for addressing issues. Fewer rural representatives in
Congress means that the profession will have to do
a better job of educating nonagricultural and nonru-
ral interests as to the problems facing farmers and
rural communities, and explaining why government
intervention is the appropriate means of addressing
those problems.Salathe: The 1995 Farm Bill: Discussion 51
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